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*file  
mid-1965*

25X1A

██████████ - 7 Oct 69

OCI GRAPHICS

Al said that OCI Graphics was disbanded just before the Indo-Pak war over Kashmir in Sept 1965. ██████████ retired. Rest of staff joined CIA graphics. 25X1A

25X1A

██ would be good sources of info on early period of graphics under Sitroom.

**Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt**

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[REDACTED] - 21 October 1969 (x 7454)

## REQUIREMENTS

25X1A

Nick says that JJ Hitchcock's Collection Guidance Staff passed on at  
 (1967) ELW  
 a date unknown to him into the Information Requirements Staff, which now  
 handles all requirements for DDI offices. JJ's CGS was a sort of super-center  
 that included elements of the watch office, the ops center, and the requirement  
 business. This did not last long, however. Requirements was broken off  
 (presumably about the time the present Ops Center went into effect in 1965?)  
 as a separate activity.

Yes. ELW.

If IRS is the immediate successor to CGS, then the intermediate period  
 when requirements was centrally handled by OCR (now CRS) must have preceded  
 1963, when CGS was founded. Could it have been under the old ~~Liaison~~ Liaison  
 Division under [REDACTED]

25X1A

I have  
 Ask Herb Jenne, x 6614, head of IRS for letter of authorization  
 establishing his office, which now resides in Room 7 G 00.

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[REDACTED] x 5395, was involved in Requirements for a long time. He  
 might have some memories.

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██████████ - 21 October 1969 Room 2 G 24, Ext 5536

## REQUIREMENTS

In the early days, OCI had its own requirements staff (see organization memos for dates and names). 25X1A

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The PRL (Periodic Requirements List ? ) was handled by ██████████

██████████ There was an individual requirements officer for each area.

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The Comint part of the requirements staff handled all CIA Comint requirements, not just those of OCI. The PRL was also coordinated with other offices outside of OCI. ██████████ could help on this.

There was an interim period when Sheldon decided that OCI analysts knew all their counterparts in State and DDP and got them to send out requirements and that OCI did not need its own requirements staff. During this period, OCI requirements were handled by a liaison staff in what is now 25X1A Central Reference Service (CRS). (Was this before or after CGS???) ██████████ should know when this was.

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In 1963, a centralized requirements staff was set up under DDI. BDI Notice N 1-130-16 of 10 June 1963 set up the Collection Guidance Staff (under JJ Hitchcock?) to consolidate the requirements activities of all the DDI offices and to improve both the speed and quality of the service. CGS represented ~~BDI~~ CIA on COMOR and SIGINT Committees. 25X1A

DDSupport Organization Memo ██████████ of 14 July 1967, effective 1 July, set up the Information Requirements Staff under the DDI to replace the CGS. It has three branches, Human Resources, Recce, and Sigint

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██████████ in 7 G 00.

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██████████ in Human Resources group knows about CIRL and when it went into effect.

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[REDACTED] - 22 October 1969

25X1A

## CUBA TASK FORCE

Sherman Kent wrote an article for Studies in Intelligence about 1965  
DDI Research Staff wrote an exhaustive substantive study of the events  
J.J. Hitchcock honshoed an exhaustive study of CIA's operations laid  
on by the Inspector General (this was not an IG investigation of inspection,  
however, and might be releasable).

25X1A

Nobody in OCI ever did an operational task force study.

Jog memories of [REDACTED]

Bruce Clarke, etc.

Get list of publications from Records Center.

During early stages of crisis, everything was so secret that memos and  
publs did not get official numbers and there are therefore no records of them.

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[REDACTED] thinks there is complete list of documents in the Records Center,  
will check.

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[REDACTED] - 22 October 1969

BRIEFINGS -

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[REDACTED] has records of briefings and debriefings in OCI back as far as 1965, with the names and subjects of the briefings, etc, from which an analysis can be made.

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25X1A

From 1961 - 1965 there are statistical records in both [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] Admin files that indicate the total number of briefings given per year and suchlike, but there is not detailed info on subjects for this period. Prior to 1961, one will have to rely mainly on people's memories.

25X1A

3 November 1969

SHRIMP BOAT STORY - 20 Feb 1963

On the night of 20 Feb 63, [REDACTED] was Night SIDO.

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At about 1730 on 20 Feb, the Pentagon had received 2 reports - one that ~~the~~ the Cubans were shooting up a shrimp boat near shore and the other one that some persons were seen on shore on a nearby island. The Pentagon tied the two reports together and suggested that survivors from the shrimp boat had reached shore. Since this happened shortly after the Cuban missile crisis everybody in Washington was watching Cuba very closely and the shrimp boat report went up through channels to the White House.

The White House called the

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1962

- 24 Nov 69  
- 24 Nov 69

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CUBAN TASK FORCE - 1962-63

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J.J. Hitchcock and [REDACTED] were joint chiefs of the Cuban Task Force in 1963; J.J. was DAD/OCR from 1 June 62. J.J. handling relations with outside elements such as the Air Force and requirements and [REDACTED] handling internal OCI production problems.

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The notice of 21 Feb 63 appointing [REDACTED] chief of the Task Force on Cuban Intelligence Production merely formalized the withdrawal of J.J. CGS not set up till 10 Jun 63 (into the Collection Guidance Staff setup, I assume ECW). By Feb 63 Cuban activities were limited to production of the Cuban Daily Summary and a few other things. Summary continued to 21 Sep 64.

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17 May 63  
The Cuban Task Force lasted till ~~about 1963~~ when the Presentations Staff was organized and [REDACTED] was made Chief of that. He brought to that staff in his hip pocket the small remaining activity on Cuba, the DCI daily check list of Cuban matters, which by FY 65 was publ from Middle America Br. of Western Area + was discontinued 4 May 65. OCR got responsibility for handling requirements, then DDI notice of 21 Jan 63. J.J. then DAD/CR ECW

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[REDACTED] says J.J. Hitchcock definitely was NOT one of the chiefs of the Cuban Task Force. (1962)



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1951  
1952  
1954

25X1A [REDACTED] 8 December 1969

OCI'S PRINTING SERVICES

When OCI was founded in 1951, [REDACTED] of Security and [REDACTED]

25X1A

[REDACTED] put out the office publications on a multilith machine. They soon were overwhelmed and complained. [REDACTED] was then hired to help out.

He hired one or two other people to help him. [REDACTED] was hired as a typist to type the Current Intelligence Bulletin.

25X1A

In 1952, management stepped into the picture and said that the various components ~~the~~ of CIA should not have their own printing plants but that all printing in CIA should be centralized. After a number of conferences,[REDACTED] agreed to give up OCI's printing plant to centralized control, provided that OCI (1) maintained control of priority, (2) maintained control of quality, and (3) management gave [REDACTED] a standing equal to that of other CIA printers. The first two points were agreed, the third was not implemented. *OCI's plant now became CIA printing plant #4.*OCI in 1952 had perhaps 90% of all the *DDI in CIA?* printing done at the time. (In 1969 OCI had about 60-65% of the printing done.) This was why it was able to dictate terms on priorities and quality. The printing plant stayed inside the cleared area because of the sensitivity of the materials it printed, and therefore was really under fairly effective control. [REDACTED] supervised its activities.

25X1A

Under [REDACTED] OCI tried to keep up with new developments in printing and by 1954 had acquired a camera to help do offset printing. [REDACTED] did a great job with printers. He trained them to do all the jobs in the plant, instead of just concentrating on one, and he raised their capabilities and their pay this way. The CIA printing service people did not have this concept of operation at all. They tried to put one of their own supervisors over [REDACTED] This man insisted the printers should have coffee breaks, do only 8 hours of work a day, and stick to their individual specialties. OCI had too many rush jobs and too many odd jobs to work this way. [REDACTED] finally had to get the

printing [REDACTED] that he could

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25X1A

[REDACTED] - 8 Dec 69 (cont)

## OOI PRINTING SERVICES

not get into the special center to bother [REDACTED] and his men.

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[REDACTED] have always been a thorn in the side of printing services because they did not play by the union rules. They do more graphics on Thursday nights for the Current Intelligence Weekly Summary than the whole of printing services does in a week. They can also do little special jobs without going through a lot of bureaucratic ~~wxxx~~ channels. Nevertheless,

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[REDACTED] still control both the priority and quality of work done in the ~~DDI~~ printing plant within the special center.

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How it will be when [REDACTED] retire (as both will do shortly)

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is a question. [REDACTED] has major contacts at high levels throughout the DDI

25X1A

and can work out priorities from the top level. [REDACTED] has also been an

25X1A

inspiration to his men. Almost certainly there will be some sort of bureaucratic fight when [REDACTED] retires. (However, the printing plant will only have to flub about one or two Presidential jobs before some pretty heavy pressure will be applied on the printing services bureaucrats. ECW)

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1950's

25X1A

[REDACTED] - 11 Dec 69

## BRIEFINGS

The White House briefings were not by any means the only ones given by the staff the Sitroom Division. Sometimes/~~XXXX~~ gave as many as 6 briefings in a morning. The Office of Civil (or Divilian) Defense Mobilization (OCDM) was briefed on a regular basis, and Sitroom staff members went with OCDM personnel on relocation exercises too. Office of Operations (OO) chief, George Carey, in Washington office, was also briefed once a week or so on S/S and special material which he could not have in his downtown office. Gordon Stewart, while he was Chief of Personnel, was briefed along with members of his staff. In 1958/59 the Office of Training personnel were briefed once a week in the auditorium. On one occasion, [REDACTED] was billed as the "President's personal briefing officer" and talked to a standing room only crowd in OTR. Sitroom staff also briefed the assembled Assistant Directors of CIA prior to DDI Amory's weekly luncheons.

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In the 1950s OCI used to brief DDP chiefs of station on how the DDI functions. This was important because very few chiefs understood how offices like OCI worked, and vital information used to get lost in DDP channels while OCI sat waiting for it - sometimes in critical situations. Now, the Chiefs of Station get briefed during Chiefs of Station seminars, but [REDACTED] is not sure that they are made to understand very well.

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1952-1960

[REDACTED] - 11 Dec 69

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# WHITE HOUSE RELATIONSHIPS

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[REDACTED] was on the White House briefing staff, Sitroom Division, OGI, from [REDACTED] to 1959. He then went on an orientation tour, following which he was made a SIDO.

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[REDACTED] developed quite close relationships with the White House staff. He saw Pres. Eisenhower on several occasions. Sherman Adams, Andrew Goodpaster, Cutler, Hogge, and others of the important White House family came regularly to the biweekly meetings at which [REDACTED] briefed. Sherman Adams was very friendly and even went to the extreme of stopping [REDACTED] in the hall and apologizing for his inability to attend certain briefings because of press of business.

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[REDACTED] believes that the 1956 alert and evacuation exercise was the first big one carried on by the whole govt in Washington. During this exercise, the CIA representative, [REDACTED] evacuated to Camp David along with the President and his staff. Joint Chiefs and Staff and State Dept. had been scheduled to evacuate too, but didnt make it. [REDACTED] was totally incorporated into the White House staff at this time, eating and sleeping with them.

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<sup>60</sup>  
In 1958<sup>60</sup> at the time of the Gary Powers U-2 plane incident, Huntington

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25X1A

Sheldon, AD/CI, and [REDACTED] again evacuated [REDACTED] When [REDACTED] saw the three-tiered bunks in the room which CIA reps were supposed to occupy, he used his connections to get Sheldon and himself moved to considerably more comfortable quarters. [REDACTED] connections also made it possible for the President and DCI Dulles to be fully supported and briefed on other occasions when the DCI went up to [REDACTED] The President introduced [REDACTED] to the Prime Minister of England on one occasion when [REDACTED] was at Camp David. He also once had breakfast with John Eisenhower, who talked to him about Pres. Eisenhower's philosophy of politics.

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CIA watch officers took over from State Dept and the JCS in manning the White House situation room earlier than the July 1961 date mentioned in ECW outline. [REDACTED] would be the best source of info on this. May have been as early as May 61. [REDACTED] day and night

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[REDACTED] - 11 Dec 69 (continued)

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WHITE HOUSE RELATIONSHIPS (continued)

duties. There were other people besides CIA men on duty during the day time.

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1961

~~1963~~

25X1A [REDACTED] - 11 Dec 69

NIGHT SIDO OPERATIONS

25X1A [REDACTED] was in the Watch Office on the night of the Bay of Pigs incident in Cuba. (As a matter of interoffice relationships) he tried to get DDP to coordinate a CIB item on the subject. DDP refused. Accordingly, [REDACTED] got at Mr. Bissell, head of DDP, after a white tie dinner at the White House and explained the situation to him. Bissell got his staff to coordinate!

25X1A The night of the Gary Powers U-2 shootdown, [REDACTED] was in the Watch. The Night Journal for that night has a story of Soviet tracking of a plane over Russia.

14-15 Feb 1963

In ~~late 1962~~ early 1963, a Venezuelan ship, the ANZOATEGUI, was

25X1A hijacked. [REDACTED] called Navy Flag Plot for information as to whether they were or could track the ship and find out where it was being taken. Navy answered that State Dept. would have to make policy on whether tracking should be undertaken. [REDACTED] called the State duty officer and was told that the matter could wait until morning. ~~The~~ President Kennedy learned of the incident the next morning and immediately asked where is the ship? When he found out that nobody was doing anything about it, he blew his top and wrote to SecState, SecDefense, and Director, CIA, taking them to task and ordering that steps be taken in future to have the capabilities of the whole government utilized promptly and in full coordination to keep tabs on such events.

25X1A The first real chart of the Watch Office and its operations was prepared by [REDACTED] for DCI McCone the morning after the incident.

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[REDACTED] - 13 Feb 70

25X1A WATCH OFFICE OPERATIONS

25X1A The less-than-perfect organization of the early Watch Office is illustrated by an anecdote told by [REDACTED] regarding a night he spent in the Watch Office as "Assistant SIDO". 25X1A

25X1A As the long 16-hour watch dragged on without much action, [REDACTED] the Watch Officer, kept mentioning something about "When we talk to the Director in the morning." [REDACTED] getting sleepier and sleepier, had no clue as to what [REDACTED] remarks involved. 25X1A

25X1A Suddenly, at 0645, the phone rang, [REDACTED] answered, and turned to [REDACTED] saying "Mr. Dulles wants to talk to you." [REDACTED] thunderstruck, said "What do I say?" [REDACTED] said, "Say good morning and tell him your name" 25X1A [REDACTED] asked "What does he want to know?" [REDACTED] said "He wants to know what 25X1A happened overnight."

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[REDACTED] did the best he could.

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25X1A

[REDACTED] - 27 February 1970

SINO-INDIAN WAR OF 1962

25X1A

[REDACTED] does not remember preparing briefings for the NSC or other high level personnel on the Sino-Indian war, probably because the NSC was not meeting under Pres. Kennedy and because Cuba crisis overshadowed everything else. He does remember contributing frequently to briefings on the world situation. Thinks SOA kept no copies of these contributions because they were only fragments of larger texts.

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[REDACTED] remembers numerous differences of opinion with China Branch, most of which were resolved in SOA's favor.

China Branch wrote less than SOA because it had to rely mainly on

25X1D

[REDACTED]  
Both desks got good service [REDACTED] on roads, ~~then~~ airfields, and ~~finally~~ military installations.

25X1D



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[REDACTED] - 24 March 1970

## CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW

25X1A

The CIWR used to be published in 4 parts - table of contents, news in brief, regular articles of current interest, and longer articles with trends and perspective.

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A comment by President Kennedy, who read the Review early in his administration, caused a revision in the format. [REDACTED] of Mildiv had written an article on Soviet naval history or something like that and had interlarded the text with pertinent quotations set in little boxes with a color tone behind the text. Kennedy complained that these little boxes broke up his rapid reading of the text. This not only led to a purge of the graphics in the CIWR but also to a change in the format of the magazine itself. This change led to a 3-part CIWR - table of contents, a merged brief and current interest section, and the long reflective and background articles.

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[REDACTED] review of the CIWR in 1962 was aimed at making the CIWR into a smaller package, with more terse narrative, and without the long reflective articles that caused the book to bulk so large that it tended to be put on one side of the desk to be read at a later date - often never. [REDACTED] therefore tried to get articles down to one page in length and to put graphics on facing pages. He also reduced the size of the page from legal-size to book-size, which enabled the full-page CIB graphics to be used on facing pages of the CIWR when appropriate. These graphics could be prepared and printed in advance, and much editorial makeup time was thereby saved by not having to fit the graphics into the text. The Week in Brief articles came down to one sentence of 4 lines of 55 units each, with the title constituting the first line and the other 3 lines expanding on the title.

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The CIWR at this time was still printed on only one side of each page. PSD, however, was working on a new automatic collating machine which could do saddle stitching, and this later led to the CIWR being printed on both sides of the page and being stitch-bound instead of stapled.


In 1962 or thereabouts there also came about a change in the process of reviewing CIWR articles. Under Sheldon, the Area Chiefs attended a weekly

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[REDACTED] - 24 March 1970 (Continued)

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meeting every Tuesday to approve the Part III reflective articles which they had previously had to read. On Wednesday, they met again to approve the short current articles. Sheldon himself approved the titles of all articles. Under Jack Smith, the Production Assistants took over most of these duties and operated on a much more informal basis. There were not more formal meetings and the time of the Area Chiefs was saved.

 - 28 April 1970

SISO's

The SISO program was set up in 1963. There was a DDI notice on the subject.

25X1A

 - 28 April 1970

STATE POLICY PAPERS

OCI first began to review State policy papers in 1963 and got into full swing with them in 1964.

The idea of CIA's reviewing these papers was conceived by Walt Rostow when he was a member of the Policy Planning Council. He broached it to the Agency, where it was received relatively coolly. DDI Ray Cline was the one who got the idea accepted. He felt it would expose more analysts to the State Department. He also had the papers pass through his new institution, the SISO's, in order to canalize the comments on them.

Actually, the papers turned out to be more work than they were worth in terms of return. This possibility had been one of the objections raised to doing them in the first place.